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ABSTRACT
SILVIA, CAITLIN
religiosity.

The impacts of terror management and self-monitoring on

ADVISOR: Ken DeBono
Previous research has shown that the cultural worldview a person holds has an
impact on his or her attitudes and behaviors throughout life. Terror management theory
posits that this worldview functions as a cultural anxiety-buffer from the overwhelming
anxiety and terror that results from a person becoming aware of his or her own mortality.
In particular, terror management theory suggests that there is a master motive behind
religion, and that when placed in a mortality salience condition, a person’s beliefs and
worldview will strengthen. Another personality variable that requires a strong worldview
or framework is self-monitoring, which allows a person to use his or her attitudes as
guides for subsequent behavior. High self-monitors base their actions on situational
information, while low self-monitors strive to act based on their true attitudes. The
current study tried to determine if terror management’s impact on religiosity could be
moderated by self-monitoring. Participants were classified as high or low self-monitors,
put in the control or mortality salience condition, and then answered questions
concerning their levels of religiosity. The results were not significant, but the patterns of
means were in the predicted direction.
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The Impacts of Terror Management and Self-Monitoring on Religiosity

The individual differences between people’s attitudes, beliefs, and actions have
been studied for years, and it seems that unseen or unconscious factors constantly play a
role. How does a man decide which worldview to hold? Why does a woman instinctively
dislike someone who challenges her political beliefs? Why do some attitudes seem to stay
relatively the same, while others change quickly in different situations? A person’s
cultural worldview clearly serves many purposes and impacts every area of his or her life.
Relatively little was known about the forces that promote allegiance to certain cultural
worldviews until Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989)
proposed terror management theory, which has become a very highly researched area in
psychology.
Terror management theory suggests that cultural conceptions of reality function as
buffers against the anxiety that is a result of the awareness of human vulnerability and
mortality (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Thus, people are highly motivated to maintain faith in
their own cultural worldviews and to defend their beliefs against any threats they
encounter. During evolution, sophisticated human intellectual abilities led to an
awareness of human vulnerability and mortality, creating the potential for overwhelming
and crippling terror. Cultural worldviews also began to develop during this time. Because
the potential for terror impacted these worldviews, any worldview that was to survive had
to provide a means to manage and lessen this terror (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). A culture’s
reality therefore became its cultural anxiety-buffer in order to protect its members.
According to terror management theory, this buffer can only be effective if a
person achieves a sense of self-esteem from his or her culture, as the culture only
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promises protection and security to the people that live up to the cultural standards of
value (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). A person hoping to receive the benefits of this buffer must
believe in the validity of the worldview and its related values and standards, and also that
he or she is meeting or exceeding these standards. A cultural worldview can allow a
person to see himself or herself as a valuable participant in a meaningful world, but only
if the buffer is constantly bolstered and protected from outside threats. Every day, people
are faced with reminders about their own deaths and vulnerability, and their buffers are
susceptible to threats from incoming information. Worldviews also require continual
social validation, making a person more likely to respond positively towards those who
bolster or reinforce his or her anxiety buffer and negatively towards those who threaten or
disagree with it (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
In their first experiment, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) investigated the idea that, when
mortality was made salient, participants would respond more positively towards those
who held the same worldviews and more negatively towards those who deviated from
their worldviews. Specifically, they asked court judges to set bond for an alleged
prostitute using the same methods they would usually use to make these judgments.
Prostitution was chosen due to the fact that it emphasized the moral nature of the crime,
and the violation of cultural norms (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Immediately before being
presented with the details of the case, mortality was made salient to half of the judges.
The judges in the mortality salience condition were asked to fill out a questionnaire that
asked about their thoughts and feelings concerning their own death. Finally, participants
were asked to set bond for the alleged prostitute.
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Rosenblatt et al. (1989) predicted that the judges in the mortality salience
condition would demand a higher bond than those in the control condition, as people who
are made aware of their mortality tend to be especially punitive towards those who
violate their worldviews. The researchers found that reminding participants of their
mortality led to the recommendation of higher bonds for the alleged prostitutes. They
ultimately attributed this finding to the aspect of terror management theory that suggests
that moral principles are part of the anxiety buffer that protects individuals from the terror
concerning their own mortality. Going against these moral principles threatens the
integrity of the buffer and causes the person to react negatively towards the transgressor.
One of the major revelations from this early study into terror management theory was that
even court judges who have undergone extensive legal training to remain wholly
unbiased are still susceptible to the effects stemming from terror management
mechanisms (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1997) also applied terror
management theory to assess its influences on people’s judgments of others. Specifically,
the researches wanted to ascertain if unconscious concerns about death motivated
allegiance to cultural beliefs, as a significant amount of information processing and selfregulatory activity seems to occur outside of conscious awareness. Arndt et al. (1997)
examined the effects of subliminal presentation of death-related stimuli on responses to
people who bolstered or threatened the subject’s cultural worldview. Because mortality
salience usually produces a defense of the worldview, the researchers hypothesized that
subjects would like the people who supported their worldviews more than they would
like those who threatened it (Ardnt et al., 1997).
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The study’s cultural worldview defense assessment and the accessibility of death
thoughts assessment were conducted in separate sessions in order to ensure that
accessibility was not artificially increased because of the assessment. In the accessibility
stage, participants were subliminally exposed to the word “death” or the word “field”
repeatedly, then filled out a measure of the accessibility of death-related thoughts (Ardnt
et al., 1997). In the cultural worldview phase, subjects first completed the typical
mortality salience task or an exam-salient control task. Participants were then exposed to
subliminal messages of either “death” or “field,” depending on the condition they were
in. Lastly, all participants evaluated pro-American essays and anti-American essays, and
indicated to what extent they found the author likable, intelligent, and knowledgeable.
The results showed that participants who were subliminally exposed to the word “death”
had higher rates of death-related thoughts They were also more likely to rate the author
who supported their worldview as more likable, knowledgeable, and intelligent, and gave
the author who contradicted their worldviews lower scores on all measures. These
findings suggest the participants’ defense of the cultural worldview, which supported the
idea that death-related thoughts have the greatest effects when they are outside of
conscious awareness (Arndt et al., 1997).
Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) and Arndt et al.’s (1997) studies showed how much a
cultural worldview that results from the cultural anxiety-buffer can permeate every area
of a person’s life. These studies imply that this worldview will remain relatively stable as
long as a person is receiving continuous social validation from it. One area where terror
management theory has been more extensively studied is religion. Terror management
theory suggests that there may be a master motive behind religion, with religious beliefs
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amplifying the cultural anxiety-buffer that prevents the terror and anxiety that comes
from understanding and being aware of human mortality (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). As
people’s mortalities become more salient, they become more motivated to maintain their
faith. The potential for overwhelming and crippling terror is constant, and religion is just
one aspect of the cultural worldview that helps alleviate some of this fear. Research on
terror management theory has consistently demonstrated that people placed in a mortality
salience condition tend to make a stronger endorsement of their own worldview
afterwards (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). In sum, terror management theory suggests that the
motive behind all religious beliefs is to abate fear associated with a person’s own
mortality, and that when placed in a mortality salience condition, a person’s beliefs and
worldviews will strengthen.
In their study on the link between terror management theory and religion, Jonas
and Fischer (2006) examined the relationship between religiosity and worldview defense
in regards to the November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul. The researchers chose to
study terrorist attacks as they tend to induce fear, anxiety, and concern about death (Jonas
& Fischer, 2006). Participants were either in high or low mortality salience conditions.
The high mortality salience condition occurred immediately after the attacks, while the
low mortality salience condition took place a week later. Jonas and Fischer (2006)
hypothesized that after the terrorist attacks, religious people were likely to affirm their
religion in order to cope with the threat of terrorism.
All of the participants were German, and first read a description of the attacks that
took place in Istanbul. Next, they were asked to answer questions regarding the
likelihood that a similar attack would occur in Germany, then filled out a religious
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orientation scale that measured both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Intrinsic religiosity
occurs when a person strives for meaning and value, internalizing his or her religious
beliefs and letting them provide motivation and direction. Extrinsic religiosity refers to
the extent to which a person uses religion to fulfill a utilitarian purpose and to obtain
other ends, such as social status, security, or comfort (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). To
measure the dependent variable of worldview defense, subjects were presented with eight
summaries of articles concerning terrorist attacks, with four saying that it was highly
unlikely that attacks would occur in Germany and four stating the opposite. They were
asked to evaluate each summary and indicate how interested they would be in reading the
whole article at the end of the study.
Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that people low in intrinsic religiousness reacted
with strong worldview defense immediately following the terrorist attacks. People high in
intrinsic religiousness did not react with the same level of worldview defense, which the
researchers attributed to the idea that the affirmation of intrinsic religious beliefs serves a
terror management function (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). As people high in intrinsic beliefs
are constantly reaffirming their views, they do not have the same need to defend their
worldview in the face of mortality salience. The participants in the low mortality salience
condition did not have the same results, possibly because the terrorist attacks were not as
fresh in their minds and they had already had time to process what had happened.
Another aspect of terror management theory to consider in conjunction with
religion is the formation of in-group biases and out-group hostilities. The worldview that
a person holds will usually be defended at all costs. A person often needs validation from
others that his or her worldviews are the correct ones, thus making social consensus an
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important process (Cohen, Jussim, Harber, & Bhasin, 2009). Cohen et al. (2009) assessed
the relationship between terror management theory and anti-Semitism, basing their
hypothesis on the idea that people prefer ideas and other people that conform to their own
worldview (Arndt et al., 1997). Cohen et al. (2009) predicted that a mortality salience
condition would increase anti-Semitism, which would manifest itself as higher levels of
hostility towards Israel.
The researchers wanted to reduce some of the problems associated with
questionnaires, so they created a bogus pipeline manipulation in order to prevent some of
the intentional lies or distortions that occur when participants want to appear
unprejudiced. Some subjects were led to believe that their underlying attitudes and
assumptions were transparent, so they should not attempt to hide them, while others were
led to believe that their underlying thoughts were private, so deception was possible.
Because of this manipulation, Cohen et al. (2009) also hypothesized that mortality
salience effects on anti-Semitism and attitudes towards Israel would be more apparent
when participants believed that they could not hide their biases. Participants were either
asked to think about their own deaths or about an upcoming exam. Those in the prejudice
obvious condition were told that the study was concerned with biases and prejudice, and
since participants knew the “purpose” of the experiment, they could hide their socially
unacceptable attitudes. Subjects in the bogus pipeline condition were told that the study
was looking at attitudes, and it was implied that the researchers would be able to tell if
the subjects were lying or not.
Questionnaires on anti-Semitism, attitudes towards Israel, and attitudes towards
Palestine were administered. The questionnaire regarding Palestine was included to
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determine whether the mortality salience manipulation affected levels of support for both
Israelis and Palestinians, or if was unique to Israeli sentiment (Cohen et al., 2009). The
researchers found support for their hypotheses, in that the combination of mortality
salience and the fear of being caught lying to appear unprejudiced increased expression
of anti-Semitism in their participants (Cohen et al., 2009). The subjects who were in the
prejudice obvious condition were able to alter their responses to appear less prejudiced
than they actually were. The results of this study support the idea that terror management
theory induces in-group biases and out-group hostilities. Cohen et al. (2009) showed that
as anti-Semitism increased, so did hostility towards Israel, especially when participants
believed they would be caught lying. Social desirability tends to manifest itself in subtle
ways, making it more difficult to hide. The mortality salience condition caused
participants to strengthen their in-group allegiance and increase hostility toward the outgroup. This study implied that hostility towards Israel may serve as a cover for antiSemitism, and that social desirability is an important factor when considering prejudice,
as prejudice is highly stigmatized (Cohen et al., 2009).
Since religious beliefs have been repeatedly implicated in the terror management
process, Friedman (2006) performed a study involving religious fundamentalism and
attitudes towards death. Specifically, he wanted to conduct linguistic analyses to assess
the language used to describe the emotions and events surrounding one’s death, and to
investigate how fundamentalism impacted responses to control and mortality salience
conditions. He chose linguistic analysis because it can help demonstrate the link between
religiosity and attitudes about death, but also the specific links between religiosity and
responses to mortality salience (Friedman, 2006). Responses in mortality salience essays
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are unrestrained, and can help give researchers insight into the most critical aspects of
people’s beliefs.
Friedman (2006) hypothesized that higher levels of religious fundamentalism
would impact subjects’ essay responses in the mortality salience condition but not in the
control condition. Participants were either asked to write about the emotions and events
surrounding their own deaths or the emotions and events surrounding the experience of
dental pain. They then filled out other measures that were not relevant to the study but
allowed for terror management mechanisms to be activated (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
After completing the filler tasks, participants answered a religious fundamentalism
questionnaire. Friedman (2006) analyzed the linguistic content of the participants’ essays,
including psychological processes, affective and emotional processes, personal concerns,
and linguistic dimensions. He found that religious fundamentalism was consistently
linked to the linguistic choices participants made when writing about their own deaths. In
the mortality salience condition, cognitive complexity decreased as religious
fundamentalism increased (Friedman, 2006).
In the essays concerning their own deaths, fundamentalists used less conditional
and tentative language, and also used terms relating to inclusion rather than exclusion.
This finding supports the idea that more strictly religious individuals think in less
elaborate, sophisticated, and complicated ways about issues that implicate their faith
(Friedman, 2006). This may explain why religious beliefs seem to strengthen in the face
of information that could undermine these beliefs. These results also offer further support
for Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) and Cohen’s (2009) findings involving in-group biases, as
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the findings suggest that high fundamentalists view their deaths as having greater social
implications that low fundamentalists do.
When faced with thoughts of their own mortalities, people will do almost
anything to buffer themselves against the intense fear and anxiety that come with these
thoughts. Renkema, Stapel, and van Yperen (2007) further investigated in-group biases
by looking at terror management in conjunction with conformity. They predicted that,
when reminded of his or her own death, a person would tend to base his or her views on
the opinions of others (Renkema et al., 2007). This hypothesis was based on the idea that
conformity is determined by the need for accurate social information and the need to
social approval. As a terror management mechanism, conformity might allow a person to
construct a coherent worldview and feel like a valuable member of his or her culture
(Renkema et al., 2007).
Participants were randomly assigned to the mortality salience condition, where
they were asked to write about their feelings associated with their own deaths, or to the
control condition, where they wrote about their thoughts associated with watching
television. Subjects were then asked to rate how much they liked different abstract
drawings. There were popularity ratings below every drawing that showed what
percentage of the population liked, disliked, or were neutral concerning that particular
drawing. Renkema et al. (2007) found that participants who had been in the mortality
salience condition tended to conform to the in-group, and follow the general population’s
ratings of the drawings. This effect was especially apparent with the drawings that
received highly positive ratings, but it was also seen to a lesser degree with the drawings
that were rated negatively. Renkema et al.’s (2007) study demonstrated that people do not
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necessarily stick to their own beliefs when faced with their mortality. Instead, they tend
to go with the flow and conform to others’ beliefs. Studies concerned with terror
management theory all seem to conclude that there is a master motive behind religion as
part of a larger cultural worldview, and that both serve the purpose of buffering some of
the anxiety and overwhelming fear associated with contemplating one’s own death.
Another personality variable that requires a strong worldview or framework is
self-monitoring. Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989) research suggested that terror management
theory necessitates having a set of worldviews that receive social validation and remain
relatively stable. Worldviews vary from culture to culture, but they consistently provide
the universe with meaning, order, and value (Greenberg et al., 1990). They provide a
context within which individuals can acquire a sense of value or self-esteem. In terror
management theory, the existence of others with different worldviews increases the
individual’s need for validation of his or her own worldview. Self-monitoring is an
individual personality variable that allows a person to use his or her attitudes and beliefs
as guides for his or her behavior. It can be connected to terror management theory
because worldviews continuously influence a person’s subsequent attitudes and behaviors
in both terror management and self-monitoring.
A person in a social setting attempts to behave appropriately for the given
situation, relying on cues to situational guidelines of appropriateness and information
about inner states and attitudes (Snyder & Tanke, 1976). People are classified as being
high or low in self-monitoring based on which sources of information they rely on more
frequently. High self-monitors tend to rely on the situational information, and therefore
change their actions from situation to situation. On the other hand, low self-monitors rely
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almost entirely on their own personalities and attitudes to decide how to act. They base
their decisions on their inner states, rather than on situational social cues or expectations
(Snyder & Tanke, 1976). In sum, low self-monitors believe that what they do and what
they believe are the same, while high self-monitors understand that their actions and
beliefs do not necessarily have to be congruent all of the time.
Snyder and Tanke (1976) assessed how the different levels of self-monitors
reacted to counterattitudinal arguments. Participants were allowed to choose to write an
essay that agreed with affirmative action programs or one that disagreed with them, and
were then convinced to write counterattitudinal essays concerning the issue. After writing
the essays, their personal attitudes on the situation were recorded. Snyder and Tanke
(1976) predicted that low self-monitors would be more likely to change their attitudes
after writing counterattitudinal essays, while high self-monitors would have a bigger
discrepancy between their actions and their actual beliefs. The researchers also
hypothesized that there would be no differences between those who were assigned to the
no-choice condition and those in the control group, where they did not have to write an
essay at all.
Snyder and Tanke (1976) found that self-monitoring was unrelated to the essay
position that the participants chose, but it did determine the relationship between
counterattitudinal behavior and true attitudes. Low self-monitors had a greater association
between the essay they chose to write and their actual attitudes. Snyder and Tanke’s
(1976) study showed just how strong the relationship is between behavior and attitude,
and that low self-monitors usually attribute their behaviors to their dispositions, while
high self-monitors almost always attribute their actions to their current situations.
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Subsequent studies applying Snyder and Tanke’s (1976) findings have focused on
the idea that attitudes based on direct experience are more predictive of future behavior
than those formed through indirect means (Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980). People who
express attitudes that reflect past behaviors and predict future behaviors are those whose
past behaviors have been relatively consistent and who base their attitudes on their
behaviors. Zanna et al. (1980) proposed an individual difference perspective for looking
at attitude-behavior consistency, with low self-monitors whose past behaviors towards
the target object have been relatively unchangeable having greater attitude-behavior
consistency than either high self-monitors or low self-monitors whose past behaviors
towards the object have varied.
Zanna et al.’s (1980) study took place in two sessions. In the first session, subjects
answered several questionnaires, including one assessing their attitudes towards religion.
They also filled out a self-monitoring scale. In the second session, which occurred one
month later, participants filled out self-reports of their religious activities and other
behaviors pertaining to religion that they had performed since the last session. Each
subject was classified as either a high or low self-monitor and as high or low on the past
behavioral variability scale (Zanna et al., 1980). The researchers’ hypothesis was
supported, with low self-monitors with low variability in past behavior showing the
highest correlation in attitude-behavior consistency. Zanna et al. (1980) interpreted these
findings as signifying that low self-monitors who consider their behavior reflective of
their attitudes, who infer their attitudes from their behavior, and whose behavior has been
relatively invariable in the past have attitudes that are most predictive of their future
behavior. If low self-monitors’ past behaviors and attitudes showed high levels of
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religiosity, Zanna et al.’s (1980) findings suggest that these actions would continue in the
future, while high self-monitors’ beliefs and actions would most likely change in regards
to the situation at hand.
Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) also looked at the impact of situations on attitudes
and behaviors. Specifically, they were concerned with the activities that individuals use
to create, promote, and enforce correspondence between their attitudes and their
behaviors (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). The researchers believed that people essentially
choose the interpersonal situations that they find themselves in, and that these choices
may reflect features of their self-conceptions, including attitudes. By choosing situations
that will dispose them to perform the actions implied by their attitudes, people may
reinforce correspondence between their attitudes and behaviors. Snyder and Kendzierski
(1982) believed that self-monitoring may play a role in this attitude-behavior relationship,
with low self-monitors placing more value on congruent attitudes and behaviors, making
their behavior more likely to reflect their attitudes and intentions. On the other hand, high
self-monitors tailor their behaviors to the situations they are in, and this impression
management usually creates contradictions between their true attitudes and their outward
behaviors (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982).
Because of these self-monitoring differences, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982)
predicted that it would be low self-monitoring subjects who would choose to enter and
spend time in situations that would cause them to behave in accordance with their
attitudes. In their study, participants were able to choose whether or not to enter a
situation that provided support for the expression of attitudes that favored affirmative
action. Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) looked at the relationship between a subject’s
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attitude towards affirmative action and his or her willingness to enter the social situation,
hypothesizing that low self-monitors with favorable attitudes towards affirmative action
would be more willing to enter and spend time in the situation than low self-monitors
with unfavorable attitudes towards it. They also predicted that high self-monitors’
willingness to enter the situation would not be significantly related to their attitudes
towards affirmative action (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982).
An experimenter contacted each participant by telephone and extended an
invitation to him or her to watch a videotape that showed women and minorities
discussing the implications of affirmative action. After, the participant would be asked to
discuss with a group what affirmative action programs would mean for both women and
minorities. Thus, the experimenter allowed each subject to choose whether or not to enter
a social situation that would promote the expression of favorable attitudes towards
affirmative action (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). The researchers found support for their
hypotheses, with low self-monitors who had favorable attitudes towards affirmative
action being significantly more likely to accept the invitation than low self-monitors with
unfavorable attitudes towards it. Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) attributed these findings
to the idea that low self-monitors habitually gravitate towards social situations that
dispose them to behave in ways that reflect their attitudes and instinctively avoid those
situations that may cause them to go against their true attitudes.
Because low self-monitors strive to stay in attitude-congruent situations, they may
have less need for the self-presentational skills that high self-monitors require. Also, their
choices of situations help defend and perpetuate their conceptions of self, as being in
situations with people that support their attitudes and behaviors gives further evidence
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that they are as consistent as they believe they are (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). Snyder
and Kendzierski’s (1982) study also lent support to the idea that high self-monitors do not
value the consistency between their public actions and private actions as much as low
self-monitors do. This study ultimately showed that high and low self-monitors do not
only differ in the importance of the congruence of their attitudes and behaviors, but also
in the types of situations they choose to put themselves in.
Klein, Snyder, and Livingston (2004) more recently assessed the relationship
between self-monitoring and the expression of prejudice in a public context. Based on
Snyder and Tanke’s (1976) earlier research, Klein et al. (2004) predicted that high selfmonitors would express more prejudiced attitudes in front of a prejudiced audience rather
than in front of a tolerant audience, since high self-monitors tend to express attitudes that
are consistent with their audience’s. They also hypothesized that low self-monitors would
not be affected by the audience’s attitudes, as they are less likely to act based on the
given situation.
This study took place in two parts. In the initial session, the participants filled out
a series of questionnaires, including a self-monitoring scale and a measure of attitudes
towards homosexuals. Participants were told that the second phase was concerned with
their perceptions of gay couples, with two-thirds of the participants being told that, just
after expressing their thoughts, they would have to share their answers with a group. Onethird of participants were told that the group’s attitudes were described as favorable
towards homosexuals, and one-third were told that the group had unfavorable attitudes
towards homosexuals. The researchers found support for their hypothesis, with high selfmonitors showing a greater likelihood of expressing an attitude consistent with their
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anticipated audience. The participants who were low self-monitors were unaffected by
their audience. Klein et al. (2004) attributed these findings to the desire for social
appropriateness that most high self-monitors show, which causes them to adopt the group
attitudes of others in order to fit in with their audience. These results fit in with the idea
of social desirability, but they also support Cohen et al.’s (2009) research on in-group
biases and Renkema et al.’s (2007) study on conformity.
For people with high self-monitoring levels, the confidence with which their
beliefs are held varies depending on whether others share or disagree with their critical
beliefs, which is similar to the effects on the cultural anxiety-buffer in terror management
theory. Thus, there is a rational connection between terror management theory and selfmonitoring. A person’s worldview consistently provides him or her with a framework
concerning the meaning and order of the universe, and is usually what informs a person
as to what his or her attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors should be. Rosenblatt et al.’s (1989)
and Greenberg et al.’s (1990) studies demonstrate how terror management necessitates
having a strong set of worldviews. Similarly, Snyder and Tanke’s (1976) and Snyder and
Kendzierski’s (1982) studies emphasize how individuals use their attitudes as guides to
how they should behave in different situations.
Based on prior research conducted on both terror management theory and the
individual personality trait of self-monitoring, I propose the idea that self-monitoring
levels can impact terror management mechanisms, and can affect individuals’ levels of
religiosity. Mortality salience conditions invoke a desire for self-preservation, which may
lead to conformity and the changing of a person’s attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, I
hypothesize that when faced with the idea of their own mortalities, low self-monitors will
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tend to strengthen their religious beliefs, while high self-monitors will not. I do not
expect to find any differences between high and low self-monitors within the control
condition.
Method
Participants
100 undergraduates at Union College took part in the study either in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement or for monetary compensation.
Procedure
Participants who volunteered to participate in this study entered the room and
were told that the study was investigating their levels of religiosity and also how they
would react to different situations they were put in. They were then given an informed
consent sheet to sign. After signing it, they were asked to complete a series of written
tasks. The first was a questionnaire, called the Personal Reaction Inventory, which
assessed the subject’s self-monitoring level (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986; Appendix A).
Next, participants were asked to respond to two open-ended questions with their initial,
gut-level responses. Those randomly assigned to the mortality salience condition were
asked to describe the emotions that the thought of their own death aroused in them, and
also what they thought would happen to them as they physically die and once they are
physically dead (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1989; Appendix B). The subjects
who were randomly assigned to the control condition were asked to describe the
emotions that the thought of dental pain aroused in them, and what they thought would
happen to them as they experience dental pain and after they experience dental pain
(Appendix C).
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After writing their responses, participants were given a questionnaire with a
number of words that described different feelings and emotions and were asked to
indicate how often they had experienced each emotion in the past few weeks. This task
was not relevant to the study, but gave the mortality salience condition time to set in
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Cohen et al., 2009). Participants then answered a series of
questions concerning their religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes. The questions were
from a combination of different scales, including the Duke Religion Index (Questions 15; Koenig, Parkerson, & Meador, 1997), the Religious Well-Being Scale (Questions 18,
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36; Paloutzian & Ellison, 1982), the Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Religiosity Scale (Questions 38, 40-47, 49, 51; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989), and the
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (Questions 52-61; Plante &
Boccaccini, 1997), that measure the degree of one’s religiosity (Appendix D). For each
scale, participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they personally agreed or
disagreed with each statement, on a 1 (they strongly disagree) to 6 (they strongly agree)
Likert-type scale. Participants then answered four demographic questions, including their
gender, age, expected year of graduation, and their religious affiliation. Finally, the
participants were given a debriefing sheet and were thanked for taking part in the study.
Results
Participants’ scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale were calculated. Using the
guidelines suggested by Snyder and Gangestad (1986), those with scores between 0-10
were categorized as low self-monitors. Those with scores from 11-18 were categorized as
high self-monitors.
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As the religiosity scales were of different lengths, the average score on each scale
was computed by dividing each participant’s score by the total number of items in the
scale. The average scores were then added together to form an overall religiosity index
(Cronbach’s alpha for the combined measure equaled .90). Scores on this religiosity
index were then submitted to a 2 (high or low self-monitor) x 2 (experimental condition)
ANOVA. Results indicated that there was no effect of condition, F(1, 71) = .210, p =
.648, such that the post-manipulation religiosity scores of those in the mortality salience
condition (M = 15.74) did not differ from those in the control condition (M = 15.31).
There was also no effect of self-monitoring, F(1,71) = 1.399, p = .241, such that postmanipulation religiosity scores of high self-monitors (M = 14.75) were not significantly
different from those of low self-monitors (M = 16.33). Importantly, the condition x selfmonitoring interaction, F(1, 71) = .266, p = .608, was also not significant, although the
pattern of means was in the predicted direction (Graph 1).
Discussion
Prior research conducted on terror management theory suggests the importance of
having a strong worldview or cultural perception of reality that can serve as a buffer
against the overwhelming, crippling terror and anxiety that are a result of becoming
aware of one’s own mortality (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). In order for this buffer to remain
effective, a person must constantly bolster it and protect it from threats. Thus, people tend
to seek social validation and respond positively towards those who reinforce and validate
their worldviews (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). One aspect of this buffer that has been
extensively studied is religion. Rosenblatt et al. (1989) suggested that there is a master
motive behind religion, and that religious beliefs actually increase a person’s cultural
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anxiety-buffer. People become more motivated to maintain their faith as their mortalities
become salient, and religion is just one thing that people use to alleviate some of the
terror they experience when thinking about their own deaths. People placed in mortality
salience conditions tend to reaffirm their beliefs and endorse their worldview more
strongly after the manipulation (Friedman, 2008).
The individual personality variable of self-monitoring also requires a strong,
unvarying worldview. Self-monitoring allows a person to use his or her attitudes as
guides for his or her behaviors. High self-monitors tend to rely on the situational
information that is available when deciding how to act in a particular social setting. In
contrast, low self-monitors use their own personalities and attitudes to decide what
behavior would be socially appropriate for the situation (Snyder & Tanke, 1976). Low
self-monitors place more emphasis on making their attitudes and behaviors congruent and
consistent, while high self-monitors do not feel that their attitudes and behaviors have to
be the same at all times (Zanna et al., 1980). A person’s self-monitoring level helps
determine how much he or she is going to rely on his or her cultural worldview when
choosing how to act and what to believe in different situations.
In both terror management theory and self-monitoring, individuals rely on their
cultural worldviews to provide the world around them with meaning, order, and value.
Worldviews also allow people to acquire a sense of value within their unique cultures
(Greenberg et al., 1990). These worldviews are fragile, and must receive constant social
validation in order to continue functioning properly. Unconscious processes are at work,
but cultural worldviews manage to permeate every aspect of a person’s life. In terror
management theory, people use their cultural worldviews as anxiety buffers against terror

23

that results from contemplating their own deaths. In self-monitoring, people use their
worldviews to varying degrees to decide how to act in various situations. The confidence
with which high self-monitors hold their beliefs varies depending on their audience.
Similarly, in terror management theory, the cultural anxiety-buffer is bolstered when
others share similar beliefs and undermined when others disagree. Thus, the connection
can be made that self-monitoring levels can impact terror management mechanisms,
consequently affecting individuals’ levels of religiosity.
The results of this study were not significant, but they were in the predicted
direction. Low self-monitors in the mortality salience condition had higher postmanipulation religiosity scores than low self-monitors in the control condition and high
self-monitors in both conditions, although the difference in scores was not large enough
to be significant. The results indicate that people’s self-monitoring levels have the
potential to moderate terror management mechanisms, showing the link between the
personality variable of self-monitoring and terror management theory. Low self-monitors
tend to be more religious than high self-monitors (Klein et al., 2004). The difference in
post-manipulation religiosity scores between low self-monitors in the control condition
and those in the mortality salience condition was greater, indicating that the pattern of
means was in the right direction.
Much research has been conducted on both terror management theory and on selfmonitoring. However, no research has been done to combine the two in order to identify
any significant interactions between them. The purpose of this study was to see what
impact the combination of mortality salience and self-monitoring might have on a
person’s level of religiosity. The hypothesis was that low self-monitors in the mortality
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salience condition would have higher post-manipulation scores than low self-monitors in
the control conditions, but that no differences would exist between high self-monitors in
the control and mortality salience conditions. This hypothesis was not wholly supported,
as the results of the interaction between self-monitoring and condition were not
significant, but they were in the right direction. The mortality salience condition seemed
to have more effects on low self-monitors, and no true differences between high selfmonitors.
An important implication of the current research is the fact that it proposes the
idea that self-monitoring, a normally undetectable and seemingly harmless characteristic,
can have such a direct impact in determining how a person reacts to something like
thoughts of his or her own death. This study was conducted on college students, but it has
implications for people of all ages. It would be useful for parents or teachers to know if
their children or students were high or low self-monitors, as it may impact their responses
to things that make their mortalities salient, like movies, television programs, or
newspapers. Being reminded of one’s own mortality is a daily part of life, but may be
more detrimental to some people than others. Personality traits play a key role in the
understandings and judgments of daily interactions, and incoming information may be
more injurious for some people than others depending on their self-monitoring level.
Also, the cultural worldview that a person holds informs every part of his or her
life. Some worldviews may require more social validation and bolstering, while others
may be able to withstand higher levels of opposing, contradicting information. Both
terror management theory and self-monitoring have implications for in-group biases and
out-group hostilities. These in-groups need to be carefully monitored to ensure that
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dislike and aversion towards the out-groups do not get out of hand. High self-monitors
may be able to alter their behaviors in order to fit in with their current audience.
However, low self-monitors are often unable or unwilling to cause a discrepancy between
their actions and their true attitudes, and mortality salience usually causes people to
strengthen their cultural worldviews. These worldviews need to be observed so that ingroup biases are not amplified to prejudices or outright discrimination.
One of the main limitations is that this study consisted of a small sample from a
relatively homogenous college. The problem with a small sample size is that the results
do not have a lot of statistical power. There were not a lot of participants in the study,
decreasing the amount of statistical strength present and increasing the risk of a type-2
error. A larger sample would give the study more statistical strength and would most
likely eventually become significant, as the pattern of means from this smaller study was
in the right direction. The problem with a homogenous sample is that the results may not
be generalizable to everyone at the college or to the population at large. College students
may be less religious than other groups due to their current level of development.
Another limitation is the fact that the filler task that was supposed to give mortality
salience time to set in may not have been long enough. Rosenblatt et al. (1989) found that
it usually takes three to five minutes for subjects to show effects of mortality salience.
However, students in the current study tended to rush through the tasks, and many
completed this filler questionnaire in about two minutes. Thus, including a longer or
additional questionnaire may cause subjects to slow down, giving mortality salience time
to set in and allow the appropriate terror management mechanisms to be activated.
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Future research should examine whether the same effects are found across
different religions or in different countries. Some religions may emphasize conformity
with all their doctrines and rituals, making it less likely that a follower will have a strong
worldview for him or her to fall back on. On the other hand, religions that stress the
importance of conformity may lead to more principled followers who internalize the
teachings of their particular religion. In this case, their attitudes would probably be less
likely to change in the face of new information or other peoples’ views that differ from
their own. In terms of countries, some countries may simply be more used to war and
strife than others, making the prospect of their own mortality and deaths less scary for
their inhabitants. People in countries where disease, violence, and war are not prevalent
may be less used to contemplating their own deaths, and therefore would be significantly
more overwhelmed with anxiety and terror in the mortality salience condition. Inhabitants
of more volatile countries would be more comfortable thinking about their own deaths,
and the effects from the mortality salience condition would be less pronounced. Another
area for future research could be looking at whether offering a way to cope with various
assaults on one’s cultural worldview would lead to less need for social validation and
terror management mechanisms. If a coping strategy was offered, the impacts of
bolstering or opposing information or views, especially opposing, may be less
pronounced and the effects of terror management might not be so substantial.
Worldviews are the things that provide meaning for the world, and people search
for ways to find support for their cultural worldviews every day. Being around people
who differ in their worldviews is a part of life, but people still must find a way to bolster
their worldviews in order to make them seem correct and valid. Self-monitoring is also a
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way that people use their attitudes, beliefs, and worldviews to make sense of the world
around them. Examining self-monitoring in conjunction with something like terror
management theory is important, because receiving reminders about the potential for
pain, aversive experience, and death is an inescapable part of daily life (Rosenblatt et al.,
1989). Self-monitoring is at work every time a person decides to voice a political opinion,
adapt to a different crowd at a party, or buy a pair of shoes even though they have gone
out of style. This study showed how some personality traits, like self-monitoring, can be
enduring and can influence every part of a person’s life. A person cannot always choose
whether or not to take someone’s opinion, judgment, or criticism to heart. The current
study demonstrates just how intertwined terror management theory and self-monitoring
can be, and that the cultural worldview that a person holds has an impact on new
evaluations and plays a more important role in everyday life that people currently
understand.
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Appendix A:
Personal Reaction Inventory
Directions: The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of
different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement
carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to
you, fill in the T, and if the statement is FALSE or MOSTLY FALSE as applied to you,
fill in the F, (e.g. (T) (F))
(T) (F) 1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
(T) (F) 2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things others will
like.
(T) (F) 3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
(T) (F) 4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
(T) (F) 5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
(T) (F) 6. I would probably make a good actor or actress.
(T) (F) 7. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention.
(T) (F) 8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different
persons.
(T) (F) 9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
(T) (F) 10. I’m not always the person I appear to be.
(T) (F) 11. I would not change my opinion (or the way I do things) in order to please
someone or win their favor.
(T) (F) 12. I have considered being an entertainer.
(T) (F) 13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
(T) (F) 14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different
situations.
(T) (F) 15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
(T) (F) 16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
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(T) (F) 17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right
end).
(T) (F) 18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

32

Appendix B:
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please respond to them with
your first, natural response.
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these questions.
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a
considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey
will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your
honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL
HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE
PHYSICALLY DEAD.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C:
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please respond to them with
your first, natural response.
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these questions.
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a
considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey
will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your
honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.
3. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
DENTAL PAIN AROUSES IN YOU.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

4. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL
HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE DENTAL PAIN
AND ONCE YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED IT.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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Appendix D:
Religiosity Survey
This survey contains questions about various aspects of your religious faith and behavior.
Please be assured that all of your responses will remain anonymous and strictly
confidential. Neither the person collecting the surveys nor those who will analyze
responses will ever know which survey you completed. Please answer all of the
questions and please be honest and accurate in your responses.

1. How often do you attend church, synagogue, or other religious meetings?
_______Never
_______Once a year or less
_______A few times a year
_______A few times a month
_______Once a week
_______More than once a week
2. How often do you spend time in private religious activities such as prayer, meditation,
or Bible study?
_______Never
_______Once a year or less
_______A few times a year
_______A few times a month
_______Once a week
_______More than once a week

For each item below, please use the following scale to indicate the degree to which you
personally agree or disagree with the statement.
1
Strongly disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly agree

3. _______In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine
4._______My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life
5._______I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life.

6._______I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the
meaning and purpose of my life
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.
1
Strongly disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly agree

7._______I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the
tensions in my world and in my relation to my world.
8._______My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
9._______God wasn’t very important for me until I began to ask questions about the
meaning of my own life.
10._______ It might be said that I value religious doubt and uncertainties.
11._______ For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
12._______ Questions are far more central to my religious experiences than are answers.
13._______I find religious doubts upsetting.
14_______As I grow and change, I expect my religious beliefs to also grow and change.
15._______I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
16._______I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.
17._______There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
18._______I don’t find much satisfaction in private prayer with god.
19._______I don’t know who I am, where I came from, or where I am going
20._______I believe that God loves me and cares about me.
21._______I feel that life is a positive experience.
22._______I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.
23._______I feel unsettled about my future.
24_______I have a personally meaningful relationship with God.
25._______I feel very fulfilled and satisfied with my life.
26_______I don’t get much personal strength and support from God
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1
Strongly disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly agree

27._______I feel a sense of well-being about the direction my life is headed in.
28_______I believe that God is concerned about my problems.
29._______I don’t enjoy much about life.
30._______I don’t have a personally satisfying relationship with God.
31._______I feel good about my future.
32._______My relationship with God helps me to not feel lonely.
33._______I feel that life is full of conflict and unhappiness.
34._______I feel most fulfilled when I’m in close communion with God.
35._______Life doesn’t have much meaning.
36._______My relationship with God contributes to my sense of well-being.
37._______I believe that there is some real purpose to my life.
38._______I enjoy reading about my religion.
39._______I go to church/services because it helps me to make friends.
40._______It doesn’t matter much what I believe so long as I am good.
41._______It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.
42._______I often have a strong sense of God’s presence.
43._______I pray mainly to get relief and protection.
44._______I try hard to live all of my life according to my religious beliefs.
45. _______What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.
46. _______Prayer is for peace and happiness.
47._______Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life.
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1
Strongly disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly agree

48._______I go to church/services mostly to spend time with my friends.
49._______My whole approach to life is based on my religion.
50._______I go to church/services mainly because I enjoy seeing other people I know
there.
51. ______Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in
life.
52._______My religious faith is extremely important to me.
53._______I pray daily.
54._______I look to my faith as a source of inspiration.
55._______I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life.
56._______I consider myself active in my faith or church.
57._______My faith is an important part of who I am as a person.
58._______My relationship with God is extremely important to me.
59._______I enjoy being around others who share my faith.
60_______I look to my faith as a source of comfort.
61.______My faith impacts many of my decisions.
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Appendix E:
Demographics Survey

Your gender (circle): Male

Female

Age__________
Expected year of graduation___________
Do you consider yourself (check most appropriate classification):
_____Catholic ______Protestant ______Jewish _______Muslim
________Agnostic ________Atheist _____Other (please specify:
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)

Graph 1:
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